Collective intentions form the basis of the social world and represent a mode of experience overlooked in some phenomenological analysis: weintentionality. Some argue that the subject of intentionality is the intending subject, but phenomenology is committed to intentionality in essence being something restricted to individual subjectivities.
Introduction
In this paper, I respond to Hans Bernhard Schmid's criticisms of subjective individualism. Subjective individualism is the position that all collective intentions are intentions had by individuals. Collective intentions are intentional states in a plural form, as distinct from a singular form. That is, collective intentions are in the form we-intend, and not the form I-intend. The paper begins by reviewing David Carr's superb analysis of plural subjects.
This serves as a point of context according to which phenomenology can more robustly interface with the collective intentionality literature. It should be noted, in addition, that Schmid too has a strong background in phenomenology. The second part of the paper reviews Schmid's arguments and outlines my response.
I
Everyday experience is intersubjectively situated; one encounters others as conscious experiencing subjects in their own right. One has experiences of others as well as experiences with others. Some experiences are in a wemode, where one describes them accurately in the manner of we did or experienced such and such. Some of these experiences are not reducible to singular intentional descriptions without a loss of meaning, i. e. not reducible to what I experience and you experience as individuals. That is to say that some experiences with others are such that one cannot describe them fully where one formulates the description as you and I did, saw, heard, experienced, etc., x, in distinction from describing them in the manner of we x. Individually oriented descriptions leave open coincidental experiences, and sometimes one uses "we" to describe cases of coincidental individual experiences, experiences that are more congruent with one another than experienced as together. Experiencing something as part of a whole, e. g. as a member of a team or in partnership with another cannot be adequately described without regarding the we-mode 2 . Such cases represent the phenomena of plural subjects. 2 It is less that something is assumed here, and more that one is focused on how the phenomena are to be described, if given rich and adequate description to more than a super-
89
In an experience that is essentially in a we-mode, i. e. a plural subject experience, one's acts of consciousness directly reference others:
The establishment of the we in common perception is the simplest form of what Husserl calls the Vergemeinschaftung der Monaden 3 : when two subjects confront one another and stand in relation to the same objects they form, to that extent, a rudimentary community that can itself be considered as performing an act (cogitamus) through "its" diverse (and in this case simultaneous) presentations 4 .
Collective intentional or intersubjective moments of experience, instances where there is a non-reducible we, can be understood as foundational for higher order intersubjective meanings. The broader social world and the meanings constituted in it are based in shared experiential foundations. This does not imply that there is strong collectivity, i. e. that collectives themselves are subjectivities. The "we" as subject of experience, the "rudimentary community", is often referred to in contemporary literature as the plural subject. David Carr states, "the community is a 'community of ficial appearance. An example presents itself to me as I am working over this material. Outside my window, the park across the way, there are three individuals playing Frisbee. One cannot play Frisbee by oneself, as it is a game that requires more than one subject. One could certainly throw a Frisbee alone, and chase after it themself. But, one is not playing at Frisbee at all if that is the case, much as one is not playing tennis is one practices against a backboard or playing baseball if one takes batting practice in a batting cage. At best, one is isolating an individual component of the larger activity, one that requires others. One might say even that such practice is best when it can simulate the presence of another in absence: when the deflection off the backboard lacks predictability, simulating another's return to some extent or the pitching machine's delivery varies based upon how the seems of the ball hit the spinning wheel, leaving indeterminate the specific behavior of the pitch one faces. While on one level, it would be to commit no violence to say the three are each individually tossing the Frisbee back and forth, this ignores the larger phenomena by reducing it to its participants and their individuated manners of relation. In other words, playing Frisbee, that which binds their actions together falls away. In more complex cases, one might point out that a corporation is has powers and characteristics that none of its individual members alone has, and that the activities of the corporation require and are constituted through the working together of the individual members and the explicitly and implicitly codified practices that inform or direct their individual activities as part of that whole.
3 Reference is to the title of § 55 of Cartesian Meditations, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1999, translation by Dorion Cairns: Cairns renders this "Establishment of the community of monads", Carr is clearly not happy with how Cairns renders Vergemeinschaftung, opting for something more like: "Monads effecting (entering into and thereby constituting) community". Carr's right to emphasize the active nature of this "community". A further alternative could be to think of Husserl's discussion as of the communalization of subjects or subjects entering into community or commerce with one another as the establishment of common ground. Italicization of those terms with shared root sense in the previous sentence is for purposeful emphasis.
4 David Carr, "The 'Fifth Meditation ' and Husserl's Cartesianism", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 34, 1 (1973), p. 30. monads, which we designate as transcendental intersubjectivity'. It is transcendental because it makes 'transcendentally possible the being of a world', in this case the intersubjective world" . Collective intentionality need not be understood as sub-5 Idem; Carr quoting from Husserl, op. cit., pp. 129f / 157f. All citations from this text of Husserl refer to the pagination of the English edition first, and the German pagination second.
6 Ibidem, p. 33. 7 Idem. 8 To assuage my realist readers who may worry about an odd multiplication of the world, allow me to offer a disambiguation. There is but one world in the physical sense of that term, that sense of world is what is often used in the natural sciences. When I use 'world' or 'worlds' where the plural use makes sense, I refer to world in the phenomenological sense: a system or network of meanings. This is the sense used when one says of someone that "they are in their own world" or of a culture distinct from one's own that "it is a whole other world". Given that there are subjectively and culturally idiosyncratic meanings, it is only natural that one can speak of worlds in this sense. I do not take the plurality of phenomenological worlds to entail anything about the metaphysics of the natural world, though I do take it to have implications relating to the socially constituted objects, categories, meanings, etc.
9 Elsewhere I have argued that one need not reify intersubjective wholes, i. e. make them into subjectivities in their own right, in order for this to happen. The systemic level interactions between individual subjects proper is what gives rise to these types of phenomena. As such, I would argue Schmid's emphasis on relationality (cfr. . Given the locus and limitation of consciousness per se to the individual subject of experience and intentionality's intrinsic origin in consciousness, it is individuals who perform the act of intentionality with reference to the cogitamus, the plural subject, and not the cogitamus itself. The grammatical subject (the subject of syntax) does not properly speaking intend anything itself. The intending subject, the conscious subject, is not equivalent to the subject of intention or subject matter of acts of consciousness, i. e. it is not the syntactical subject referenced in and through an intentional act.
Carr observes that many analytic and phenomenological philosophers agree that "it is to the I as an individual subject or person, rather than to any sort of plurality, that intentionality properly belongs"
11
. Books, 1998, pp. 54f. tent that phenomenology stays with experience, it is said to take a firstperson approach. That is, the phenomenologist is concerned to understand the perception in terms of the meaning it has for the subject"
15
. "Intentionality is a ubiquitous character of consciousness, and as the phenomenologists put it, it means that all consciousness is about or of something"
.
Phenomenology studies meanings from the first-personal perspective or as they are experienced, and all experience is someone's experience. Phenomenology's focus on experience thus directs its analyses to examinations of the intentionality of consciousness. Phenomenology appeals to consciousness as individually situated in embodied cognition; each consciousness is someone's consciousness. And, as Carr notes that while it is not controversial to refer to pluralities or groups as objects, it is rather unclear how one can consider them to be subjects
17
. Nonetheless, Carr points out that we do make attributions of perceptual experiences and actions to both individuals and groups. More importantly for phenomenology is that one can have experiences that are strongly identified with or attributed to a we, experiences that are said to be ours, not just mine or mine and yours
18
. For example, one speaks of our travels as distinct from their own individual travels, or of our nuptials, our battlefield maneuvers, our chess match, etc.
Each participant experiences the object and is aware of the others in such a way that he cannot possibly attribute the experience to himself alone. After all, it has manifold phases and perspectives, and some of these are not directly available to him at all. The experience in such cases, quite simply belongs to us; it is ours
19
.
In such experiences one does not leave behind a first-personal point of view, only shifting from a singular to a plural form or plural mode of experi- Subjective individualism is the position that intentionality of any form, collective intentionality in particular, "is exclusively in the minds of individu-20 Ibidem, pp. 525-527. The distinction is nice, insofar as it gets at both intentionality proper (Intentionalität) and the sense of intent associated with goal-directed action (Absicht). This distinction, it is argued elsewhere in the dissertation, is too often glossed over or collapsed in English-language philosophy. . One of Bratman's motivations for his individualism is shared with Searle: "a shared intention is not an attitude in the mind of some superagent consisting literally of some fusion of the two agents. There is no single mind which is the fusion of your mind and mine" 28 . However, Bratman's view departs from Searle's on the issue of reductionism. Bratman's view is that qua individualism, any collective or group intending must be reducible to the intentions of individuals. The reductive stance that results in formal individualism is reached on the grounds that shared activity requires a plurality of participants, each required to be in a given range of mental states relative to that activity. Searle, on the other hand, is against reducibility on the grounds that the mental state that is a collective inten- 29 Bratman is careful to try and distinguish his account of shared intentions, which is individualistic and expressly reductive in spirit, from Searle's collective intentions, Raimo Tuomela's we-intentions -Bratman may be incorrect on this point; see Raimo Tuomela, " Collective and Joint Intentions", Mind & Society, vol. 2, 1 (2000) 39-69-, and Gilbert's plural subjects (Michael E. Bratman, op. cit., (5) (6) (7) (8) . Bratman insists that his shared intentions tion is singular, not compound -i. e. it is not built up out of other individual mental states. The non-reducibility of the intentional or mental state itself does not have to preclude the participation of others whatsoever. With respect to conditions for realization of action, shared intentions, and perhaps other species of collective intentions more generally, are not satisfied simply on the grounds that the activity itself is engaged in by a plurality of individual subjects. Rather, those implicated and involved must share a proper intentional stance towards the intended action in order for the fulfillment of that intention. The evidentiary action(s) relative to the content specified by a collective intention is reducible to the actions of individuals alist points to is that all experience is someone's experience, I fail to see are of a narrower focus than either Searle or Tuomela's objects of concern, which do not involve distinguishing between an individual's intention for a group's activity and an individual's intention for shared activity (cfr. p. 116, n17, and p. 145, n6). I have no objection to Bratman's distinction. However, I would suggest that his shared intentions be viewed as a species of collective intentions. The success conditions are more stringent, but what goes more generally for collective-or we-intentions follows with respect for shared intentions. I understand such a distinction in the following manner. The object of a shared intention is shared cooperative activity. The object of a collective intention is collective activity. I view shared cooperative activity as a species of collective activity.
30 Leo Zaibert has argued that Searle is committed to formal individualism in virtue of his taking both a non-summative approach to collective intentionality and his subjective individualism. (Leo A. Zaibert, "Collective Intentions and Collective Intentionality", in David Koepsell / Laurence S. Moss (eds.), John Searle's Ideas About Social Reality: Extensions, Criticisms and Reconstructions, Oxford, Blackwell, 2003, pp. 209-232 There is precedent for rejecting formal individualism in early phenomenology. Aron Gurwitsch roundly criticizes traditional ways of describing our experiences of others, whereby those experiences become philosophically problematic. In response to the philosophical motivations to recognize a problem of other minds framed in terms of access, Gurwitsch rejects formal individualism. The problem for formal individualism is that it conflates the singularity inherent in consciousness' always being someone's, the mineness of experience, with consciousness' being singular in the form of its intentional act: "As a result, however, the 'mental processes appertinent to Included in the sense of every mental process, in the effecting of which we know judgmentally, let us say, that other people also effect similar mental processes, there is also the co-presence of those others which is co-apprehended through the "we" (and, more particularly, coapprehended as effecting these mental processes together with me). On the basis of the immanental co-presence of others pertaining to the sense of these mental processes -others together with whom I effect the mental processes in question-these mental processes are determined specifically as ours and are distinguished from those that are specifically mine.
34
And subjective individualism is not in jeopardy in that "the ego is a constitutive moment in each mental process as mental process, [thus] Diagnosing the problem with traditional approaches to our experiences of others, Gurwitsch notes that a major contributing factor to how philosophy has erred so consistently is it has traditionally carried an operating assumption that all meaning is homogeneous, primarily -I add-through how we think about propositions. can now direct my thoughts towards a unicorn. That intention is of something, namely the content "unicorn" which has a sense, but fails to represent any real object in the world. Error, then, can occur when a subject forms a judgment, the underlying intentional content of which has no object in correlation. The same applies in relation to collective intentions. For instance, one could intend that we all flap our arms and fly to Australia to have tea with the Queen of England. That is in the form of a collective intention, but its content represents an impossibility (our flying without technological aid) and an implausibility (our having tea with the Queen of England in Australia). Simply because the object intended is not satisfiable does not change that the content of the intention is of a specific sort -an intention for collective action. Critics of subjective individualism, like Schmid and Meijers, conflate intentional character and intentional relation, attempting to reduce the former into the latter. They do so by counting the collective intentional domain in terms of its object, through counting intentional contents as dependent on the objects in question. But, socially constituted objects are constituted by the very contents in question. With emphasis on the object, they thus consider the subject's act of intending in relation to what is in the world and not the content manifest in consciousness. As such, the role of the individual is effectively nullified, given the emphasis on the onto- 41 David Woodruff Smith, The Circle of Acquaintance, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1989, § 3. 3. logical relations, where the epistemic relations are determined in lieu of the ontology. The mistake lies in that social objects get their being through the epistemic relations. In other words, since epistemic relations intersubjectively extended constitute social objects, it is erroneous to count those as posterior to that which they constitute.
Regarding the first concern of Schmid's noted above, he states: "Collective intentions, however, are not intentions of the kind anybody has for herself -not single individuals, and not some group mind. Rather, it is something individuals share"
42
. I am sympathetic to Schmid's refusal to understand intentional acts as being like paper in a wastebasket: being located "in" something. However, the question of an intentional act's spatial location amounts to a category mistake. When one refers to a spatial location at all, for example neurological events in one's brain, one is changing the subject matter. Even if identity theories of mind are true, this holds: qua intentional act, it is nonsense to speak in spatial terms, even if qua neurological correlate there is sense to asking, in rough terms, about spatial extension and location. Schmid is wrong to think that intentional acts could happen without a subject. While he is correct that the strong form of a 'we' intends something shared, Schmid is collapsing the distinction between the inten- 44 In a paper published online, Leo Zaibert and Barry Smith insightfully argue that it is common in contemporary philosophy to speak of normativity as a homogenous whole and that this is clearly inadequate (http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/ Normativity.pdf). Zaibert and Smith find at least three kinds of normativity (labels mine): 1) Rule normativity -normativity derived from constitutive rules; 2) Grounding normativity -normativity which is necessary as a pretext to the possibility for social action; 3) Phenomenological normativity -normativity dependent on the essential structures of mental phenomena (Leo Zaibert / Barry Smith, op. cit., p. 17) In particular, I find the third category interesting, as the later Husserl began to give explicit treatment to such "proto-normativity" constitutive in the structure of experience (cfr. Though both kinds of statements state matters of fact, the statements containing words such as "married", '"promise", "home run", and "five dollars" state facts whose existence presupposes certain institutions: a man has five dollars, given the institution of money. Take away the institution and all he has is a rectangular bit of paper with green ink on it 47 .
What Schmid presents one with are two false dilemmas. Schmid's first false choice is that one must either choose to deny an adequate view of social normativity or deny subjective individualism. If this is a genuine choice, then it would seem that we would have to rule against the majority of philosophy and human history on the subject matter, many of the great philosophical thinkers, not the least of which includes Plato and Aristotle, succeed in both presenting subjectively individualistic theories and accounting for social normativity. Normativity can arise out of intentional relations ex- 45 Cfr. John R. Searle, "How to Derive 'Ought' From 'Is'", The Philosophical Review, vol. 73,1 (1964) plausible to assume that for Schmid, the former disjunct is motivated by the latter. Yet, implicating others in one's intentional life, through the "we" form of intention, seems to rather clearly and expressly reference one's relatedness to others.
In speaking of this second concern, Schmid again appeals to the forced spatial metaphor of tradition: "Collective intentions are not intentions of the kind anybody 'has' -not single individuals, and not some super-agent. For collective intentionality is not subjective. It is relational"
49
. While I agree with Schmid that no super-agent is necessary and that collective intentionality is not merely subjective in the sense of being whatever an individual wants it to be, Schmid evades offering an argument as to why being relational means not being subjectively individualist, i. e. why relationality implies that collective intentional states are not states of consciousness. I can understand wanting to avoid reifying or hypostatizing intersubjective relations or reducing all reality to predicates and subjects. One can further appreciate the desire to emphasize the dynamic nature of our interrelatedness with one another. However, one mustn't forget the simple point that relations require relata. There are no free-floating relations. One doesn't need to assume that one's relata are static in nature. If, for instance, one's subjects-in-relation with one another are dynamic beings, it only would figure that the nature of their relations would be fluid and dynamic as well. Schmid, like many contemporary reactionaries to the Modern philosophical tradition, over plays his hand. "Subject" does not entail "static", "without relation", or "essentially preconfigured in toto", such that relations become superfluous or non-essential to our ontology, or whatever
Modern conclusion Schmid seeks to draw regarding the nature of subjectivity.
To say from the first-personal orientation of phenomenological inquiry "that a community is primarily or essentially an intentional subject is to say that, whatever else it might be, it exists primarily through its intentional properties -its experiences and actions-which gives its the character of being of"
50
. This is to say plural subjects, or communities, embody orientations to the world, things in the world, and other communities and individuals in the world as well. In short, communities might be understood as communally held sets of comportments. Crucially, however, to use the third-person "it" in such descriptions is highly artificial and misleading. Better to say: for any such community of which I am a member, it is we who experience, believe, feel and act; it is in and through such intentional relations, and through the narrational form of reflection and selfconstitution… that we exist and maintain our existence as a community 51 .
Following which Carr denies making any ontological commitments as to the status of the community itself, a view we turn critically to shortly. Key to my purposes here is that Carr is asserting that communities, plural subjects, are intentional achievements of the individuals who compose them, and which in turn affect and inform their members' perceptions or actions.
"As a world they make up not a collection of objects and objective relations but a complex of meaning which is not detachable from the community intentionality which constitutes it"
52
. Even if a plural subject has an independent set of characteristics that are not reducible to those of their individual members, there is no plural subject independent of those members. To clarify: plural subjects are ontologically dependent on individuals, as conscious, beings capable of setting up a world, and imbuing intentionality in a derived form beyond themselves -e. g. through the formation of symbols, lan- 59 As one moves into these more formalized intentional systems one invokes and attributes deontic powers derived from the collective intentional achievements of those involved. Searle's original account evoked constitutive rules (X counts as Y in context C) as the mechanism for this. More recently, Searle has revised his position somewhat. He now counts constitutive rules as types of performative declarative acts (by Declaration we create the Y ing these subjects in a manner that is plausibly verifiable. Metaphorical senses have conditions for fulfillment that are complex, untidy, and that can mask their more direct descriptive elements in virtue of their distance and historical derivations from intrinsic intentionality.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Schmid's mistake is to count the experiences in question as necessary conditions for collective intentionality. However, it is collective intentionality that is necessary to those experiences, not the reverse.
Schmid would be correct in identifying plural subject experiences as sufficient conditions for the presence of collective intentionality. Even if collective intentionality ranges over a plurality of subjects, one need not radically revise the nature of intentionality to account for that characteristic. Rather, the important point is that collective intentions attribute meanings to nonarbitrary collectives of subjects. And, those collectives of subjects might have derived capacities in virtue of the collective intentionality of their shared endeavors. status function), and that it is the declarative act that is the more basic species of intentional act pertinent to these powers (John R. Searle, Philosophy in a New Century: Selected Essays, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, Addendum to Chapter 2, pp. 48-51). This is clearly a response to the vast set of criticism surrounding constitutive rules since Searle's original formulation of his social ontology. Whether or not this adjustment satisfies his critics or not remains to be seen, though I suspect it only pushes any problems back a step. However, my own feeling is that Searle is aiming at a generally correct type of approach despite potential shortcomings.
